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Abstract : The purpose of this study is to analyze the position and authority of the Judicial Commission of the 
Republic of Indonesia and its comparison to the Netherlands Council for the Judiciary. This comparative study 
applied a normative juridical method. The data used in this study were secondary data. The collected data were 
then analyzed qualitatively. The results showed that Judicial Commission has an important position in judicial 
system in Indonesia so as structurally, its position is aligned with the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court 
of the Republic of Indonesia. Yet, functionally, its role is auxiliary to the judicial power institutions. Although the 
function of the Judicial Commission is related to judicial power, but the Judicial Commission is not an agent of 
judicial power, rather, it is an agency enforcing code of ethics of judges. Besides, the Judicial Commission is also 
not involved in the organization, personnel, administration and financial matters of judges. This condition is 
different from the Judicial Commission in European countries, such as the Netherlands. The Judicial Commission 
in the Netherlands (The Netherlands Council for the Judiciary) has an authority in the area of technical policy and 
policy making in the field of justice. The Netherlands Council for the Judiciary and other Judicial Commission in 
European countries generally have the authority in managing organization, budget and administration as well as 
in conducting promotions, transfers, and recruitments as well as imposing sanctions on judges. Thus, the 
Supreme Court only focuses on carrying out judicial functions and does not deal with administrative and judicial 
organization matters. 
Keywords: Comparison; the Judicial Commission of the Republic of Indonesia; the Netherlands Council for the 
Judiciary. 
 
Perbandingan Komisi Yudisial Republik Indonesia dan Komisi Yudisial Belanda 
 
Abstrak : Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk mengetahui dan memahami tentang kedudukan dan 
kewenangan Komisi Yudisial Republik Indonesia serta perbandingannya dengan Komisi Yudisial Belanda. Metode 
penelitian yang digunakan yaitu yuridis normatif dengan cara perbandingan (komparatif). Data yang digunakan 
adalah data sekunder sedangkan analisis data dilakukan secara kualitatif. Hasil penelitian yaitu bahwa 
kedudukan Komisi Yudisial sangat penting, sehinggasecara struktural kedudukannya diposisikan sederajat 
dengan Mahkamah Agung dan Mahkamah Konstitusi. Namun demikian  secara fungsionalperannya bersifat 
penunjang (auxiliary) terhadap lembaga kekuasaan kehakiman. Komisi Yudisial meskipun fungsinya terkait 
dengan kekuasaan kehakiman tetapi bukan  pelaku kekuasaan kehakiman, melainkan lembaga penegak norma 
etik (code of ethics) dari hakim. Selain itu Komisi Yudisial juga tidak terlibat dalam hal organisasi, personalia, 
administrasi dan keuangan para hakim. Hal ini berbeda dengan Komisi Yudisial yang ada di negara Eropa 
misalnya Belanda. Komisi Yudisial di Belanda (Netherland Council for Judiciary) memiliki kewenangan pada area 
kebijakan teknis dan pembuatan kebijakan pada bidang peradilan.Komisi Yudisial Belanda dan di Eropa pada 
umumnya mempunyai kewenangan dalam hal mengelola organisasi, anggaran dan administrasi peradilan 
termasuk dalam melakukan promosi, mutasi, rekruitmen dan memberikan sanksi terhadap hakim. Mahkamah 
Agung hanya fokus melaksanakan fungsi peradilan yaitu mengadili dan tidak mengurusi masalah administrasi 
dan organisasi peradilan. 
Kata Kunci: Perbandingan; Komisi Yudisial Indonesia, Komisi Yudisial Belanda. 
 
  
INTRODUCTION 
 Two state institutions, namely the Constitutional Court and the Judicial Commission, are 
established after the amendment of the 1945 Constitution in the field of judicial power. This 
establishment aims to enhance the role of the judicial power institutions in Indonesia. As result, 
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relations between state powers are shifted. Executive power carried out by the President, legislative 
power carried out by the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia, and judicial power 
carried out by the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia are an 
embodiment of checks and balances system.
1
 Amandement of the legislations in the field of judiciary is 
one of the steps that needs to be taken to rebuild judicial institutions in Indonesia. The problems 
surrounding the judiciary cannot be handled due to the weaknesses of various regulations which have 
failed in creating a system that is conducive to build an independent, impartial, clean, competent and 
efficient court. Another important effort to synergize judiciary reform in Indonesia is the establishment 
of an institution called Judicial Commission as regulated in Article 24B of the Third Amendment of the 
1945 Constitution and Law No. 18 of 2011 concerning Amendment to Law No. 22 of 2004 concerning 
Judicial Commission. The establishment of Judicial Commission is a logical consequence arising from 
the merging of the judiciary in the Supreme Court. It turns out that the merging has the potential to 
cause a monopoly on judicial power by the Supreme Court. In addition, there is a concern that the 
Supreme Court will not be able to carry out administrative, personnel, financial and court organization 
authority which has been carried out by the Department of Law and Human Rights all the time. There is 
even a pessimistic view that the Supreme Court cannot carry out the given authority properly.
2
 
Therefore, it is considered necessary to have an institution outside the Supreme Court that can supervise 
the judges’ behavior within the Supreme Court. In this case, the Judicial Commission is a state 
institution that has the authority to supervise the behavior of judges, supreme justices, and constitutional 
judges in which its position is outside the scope of judicial power in order to maintain the judges’ 
integrity.
3
 
A study conducted by A. Ahsin Thohari concluded that the main reasons for the emergence of the 
idea of establishing a Judicial Commission in various countries are: 
(1) A weak monitoring against judicial power as monitoring is only carried out internally. 
(2) There is no institution serving as a liaison between government authorities, in this case the 
Department of Justice, and judicial power.  
(3) Judicial power is considered not to have sufficient efficiency and effectiveness in carrying out its 
duties if it is still preoccupied with non-legal technical issues. 
(4) A low quality and lack consistency of judicial institutions decisions since they are not intensively 
monitored by independent institutions, and 
(5) Judicial recruitment pattern is too biased with political issues since the institutions that propose 
and recruit them are political institutions, namely the president or parliament.
4
 
In Indonesia, the position of the Judicial Commission is determined by the 1945 Constitution as a 
separate State institution because its role is considered very important in an effort to safeguard and 
uphold the honor, the high status and the behavior of judges. If judges are respected for their integrity 
and quality, the rule of law can then be enforced as it should be. The enforcement of rule of law is 
actually a prerequisite for the growth and soundness of a democratic system that is to be built according 
to the constitutional system of the 1945 Constitution. Democracy is impossible to grow and develop, if 
the rule of law is not upheld by its honor, authority, and trustworthiness. Due to the importance of 
efforts to safeguard and uphold the honor, the high status and the behavior of judges, a separate 
                                                             
1
 Abustan. “Relasi Lembaga Negara dalam Perspektif Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia 
1945”, Jurnal Unifikasi, Vol. 4, No. 2, Juli 2017, p.59. 
2
 Sirajuddin  dan  Zulkarnain, 2006, Komisi  Yudisial  Dan  Eksaminasi Publik, Bandung : Citra Aditya 
Bakti, p. 70-71. 
3
 Erniyanti. “ Eksistensi Kewenangan Komisi Yudisial dalam Pengawasan Hakim Menurut Undang-Undang 
Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945”, Jurnal Samudra Keadilan, Vol. 10, No.2, 2015, p. 242. 
4
 A. Ahsin   Thohari, 2004,  Komisi Yudisial dan  Reformasi Peradilan, Jakarta :  Lembaga Studi dan 
Advokasi Masyarakat (ELSAM), p. 31. 
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independent institution needs to be established so that supervision can be carried out effectively. The 
internal supervision system, as it has been done so far, namely the presence of honorary judges, has not 
proven effective in conducting supervision. Therefore, in the amandement of the 1945 Constitution, a 
separate institution called the Judicial Commission was established.
5
 Weak internal supervision 
institutions are influenced by several factors, namely inadequate quality and integrity, intransparent 
disciplined inspection processes, lack of easiness for the public to complain and monitor the process 
and results of their complaints, a strong spirit of defending corps, and unwillingness of the institution’s 
leaders.
6
 
Further, the existence of new institution that will monitor judges’ behavior in the constitutional 
system of the Republic of Indonesia is regulated in the 1945 Constitution. With the existence of Judicial 
Commission as a state auxiliary organ against judicial power institutions, it is expected that the ethical 
behavior system in all sectors both superstructure and infrastructure of the state can be developed 
accordingly in order to realize the rule of law and the principles of good governance in all fields.
7
 In 
carrying out its authorities and duties, there have been many positive things done by the Judicial 
Commission, especially in conducting selection of candidates for supreme justices. Yet, in terms of 
protecting the honor of judges from disgraceful acts and unprofessional conduct, the role of the Judicial 
Commission has not been optimal. Besides, there are still many recommendations proposed by the 
Judicial Commission related to judges are ignored by the Supreme Court.
8
  
In contrast, one of the reasons of the establishment of the Judicial Commission in European 
countries is to revive public trust against judiciary. Many reasons and motives exist to establish Judicial 
Commission in European countries. Yet, in some European countries, Judicial Commission is 
established with the aim of developing and realizing efficient judiciary. The main roles of Judicial 
Commission in Europe are; 1) ensuring the independence of judiciary; 2) proposing candidates for 
judges, providing quality education for judges, and performing other functions, such as enforcing 
judicial discipline, selecting judges, providing professional education for judges, testing judges’ 
competences, and enforcing code of ethics of judges; and 3) taking over the judicial management 
function from the government (executive). Those are the roles of Judicial Commission in European 
countries, especially in Northern Europe, such as the Netherlands.
9
  Based on this description, this study 
tries to analyze the position and authority of the Judicial Commission of the Republic of Indonesia 
compared to the Netherlands Council for the Judiciary. 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
            This comparative study applied a normative legal method. The data used were secondary data, 
namely the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, Law No. 22 of 2004 concerning Judicial 
Commission, Law No. 18 of 2011 concerning Amendment to Law No. 22 of 2004 concerning Judicial 
Commission, the Dutch Constitution (Ground Wet), research results, journals, books, and legislations. 
The collected data were then analyzed qualitatively. The stages of data analysis included; 1) data 
                                                             
5
 Jimly Asshiddiqie, 2005,Perkembangan  dan Konsolidasi Lembaga Negara Pasca Reformasi, Jakarta : 
Konpress MKRI, p. 187-188. Lihat juga Titik Triwulan Tutik, 2007, Eksistensi, Kedudukan dan Wewenang 
Komisi Yudisial ; Sebagai Lembaga Negara Dalam Sistem Ketatanegaraan RI Pasca Amandemen UUD 
1945, Jakarta : Prestasi Pustaka Publisher, p. 78-84. 
6
 Nurhayati, Nunik. “ Eksistensi Kewenangan Komisi Yudisial Republik Indonesia dalam Undang-Undang 
Dasar Republik Indonesia 1945”, Jurnal Law and Justice, Vol. I, No. 1, 2016, p.12. 
7
 Jimly Asshiddiqie, Loc. Cit., p. 188. 
8
 Sutiyoso, Bambang. “ Penguatan Peran Komisi Yudisial dalam Penegakan Hukum di Indonesia”, Jurnal 
IusQuia IusTum, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2011, p.268. 
9
 Wim Voermans, “Indonesia Councils for Judiciary, Seminar of Comparative Models of Judicial 
Commissions” Makalah dalam Seminar Peran Komisi Yudisial Di Era Transisi Menuju Demokrasi, Komisi 
Yudisial RI, 5 Juli 2004, Jakarta. 
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collection, 2) data selection and classification which were done systematically and logically to find out 
the specific picture related to the problem discussed, 3) data interpretation, and 4) data comparison with 
theories and concepts from the secondary data used. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A. The Judicial Commission of the Republic of Indonesia 
1. Position, Organization and Membership  
Judicial Commission has an important position in judicial system in Indonesia so as structurally, 
its position is aligned with the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Indonesia. However, it should be noted that, although structurally its position is aligned with the 
Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, but functionally, its role is 
auxiliary to the judicial power institutions. Although the function of Judicial Commission is related to 
judicial power, but Judicial Commission is not an agent of judicial power. The Judicial Commission is 
not a code of law enforcement agency, but a code of ethics enforcement agency because this 
commission only deals with the honor, the high status and the behavior of judges, not with judicial 
institutions or judicial power institutions. Its existence is actually derived from the internal 
environment, namely from the conception of honorary judges existing in judicial profession and within 
the Supreme Court. It means that this ethical auditor function was internal. However, to better guarantee 
the effectiveness of its authority in order to supervise the behavior of judges, the function is shifted to 
be an external auditor in which its position is aligned with the supervisor.
10
 
Although structurally its position is aligned with the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, 
but due to its nature as an auxiliary to the judicial power institutions so that its protocol position does 
not need to be treated the same as the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, the House of 
Representatives, the Regional Representative Council, and the Audit Board. Since Judicial Commission 
is not a state institution carrying out the function of state power directly, the Judicial Commission is not 
a judicial, executive, or legislative institution. This commission only functions to uphold the honor, the 
high status and the behavior of judges as law enforcement officials and institutions that carry out the 
functions of judicial power.11 In Indonesia, as stated in the 1945 Constitution, Law No. 22 of 2004 and 
Law No. 18 of 2011, the strategic roles that can be carried out by Judicial Commission is; 1) proposing 
the appointment of supreme justices – this role is done to avoid the strong interests of the executive or 
legislative in the recruitment of supreme justices, and 2) safeguarding and upholding the honor, the high 
status and the behavior of judges – this is done with systematic and intensive external supervision by 
independent institutions and community towards the judiciary.
12
 
This role must be immediately realized by Judicial Commission in order to improve the 
implementation of law enforcement in Indonesia. The number of alleged bribery cases involving judges 
in the Supreme Court has decreased public trust against this institution. The spread of pessimism and 
public distrust against law enforcement institutions in Indonesia has lasted for a long time. The 
indication of case trading by law enforcement officials occurred from the first court to the appeal level 
in various regions. The widespread bribery cases involving judges has further strengthened the negative 
image of the court as well as has shown the difficulty to find legal justice that is truly clean and 
objective in judicial system in Indonesia.
13
 Article 24A paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution states 
candidates for supreme justices are proposed by the Judicial Commission for approval to the DPR and 
                                                             
10
 Ibid., p. 189.   Lihat juga Jimly Asshiddiqie, 2009, Komentar Atas UUD Tahun 1945, Jakarta : Sinar 
Grafika, p. 100. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Sirajudin and Zulkarnain, 2006, Komisi Yudisial..., Op Cit, p. 72-73. 
13
 Ibid., p. 73. 
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subsequently installed as supreme justices by the President. Article 24B of the 1945 Constitution 
describes that: 
(1) The Judicial Commission shall be independent in nature and have the competence to make 
proposals for the appointment of supreme justices as well as other competences within the 
framework of safeguarding and upholding the honor, the high status and the behavior of judges. 
(2) The members of the Judicial Commission must have knowledge and experience in matters of law 
and an integrity and personality beyond reproach. 
(3) The members of the Judicial Commission are to be appointed and dismissed by the President in 
agreement with the DPR. 
(4) The organization, authority, and membership of the Judicial Commission shall be regulated by law. 
Of these duties and authorities, it is clear that the Judicial Commission is auxiliary to the 
implementation of the tasks of judicial power which is ultimately held by the Supreme Court. The tasks 
relate to the recruitment of supreme justices and the coaching of judges in an effort to safeguard and 
uphold the honor, the high status and the behavior of judges. The honor, the high status and the 
behavior of judges are very important to be safeguarded and upheld so that the judicial system in 
Indonesia as a whole can be trusted by the community. Democracy will not grow and develop without 
being controlled by the rule of law which is based on a credible judicial power system. To safeguard 
and build confidence, a separate institution is needed to carry out this noble effort.
14
 
The Judicial Commission is not intended as a rival institution nor is it in a position against the 
judicial institutions. The Judicial Commission is not a judicial supervisory agency or a judicial power 
supervisory agency. The Judicial Commission is also not established with the purpose to eradicate 
judicial mafia since judicial mafia is included in the category of criminal act that must be eradicated by 
law enforcement officials. Whereas, the Judicial Commission is not an agency of law enforcement, but 
an agency that enforces ethical codes and behaviors deviation of judges (deviation against legal norms). 
The supervision carried out by the Judicial Commission is very important to encourage judges to 
improve themselves and to avoid improper behavior. If there is an indication of violation, the Judicial 
Commission can proceed to law enforcement officials for further legal proceedings.
15
 
By the existence of the Judicial Commission, it is expected that the system of rule of ethics can 
be developed effectively, in addition to the system of rule of law that needs to be continuously 
strengthened. If the implementation of the duties of the Judicial Commission in safeguarding and 
upholding the honor, the high status and the behavior of judges can be carried out properly, it will 
indirectly influence the efforts to build a reliable judiciary which is free from corrupt and collusive 
practices as well as judicial mafia. Therefore, the successful implementation of the duties of the Judicial 
Commission itself is important to clean the court of all dirty practices.
16
 One of the reasons for 
establishing the Judicial Commission is that citizens outside the official structure of the parliamentary 
body can be involved in the appointment process, performance evaluation and possible dismissal of 
judges, and safeguarding the honor and the high status of judges. Thus, it is expected that the judicial 
power independence and the accountability principle of judicial power both in legal and ethical terms 
can be realized. Therefore, the independent supervisory institution of judges must be formed outside the 
structure of the Supreme Court. Through the Judicial Commission, it is expected that the community’s 
aspirations will be involved in the process of appointing a Supreme Justice and evaluating work ethics 
and possible ethical violations committed by judges. 
In that context, at first, the existence of the Judicial Commission was also associated with a 
supervisory function that was external to the judicial power. The existence of the Judicial Commission 
                                                             
14
 Jimly  Asshiddiqie,  2008,   Pokok – Pokok   Hukum   Tata   Negara  Pasca  Reformasi, Jakarta : Bhuana 
Ilmu Populer,  p. 576-577. 
15
 Ibid., p.577. 
16
 Ibid., p.577-578. 
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outside the structure of the Supreme Court is considered important so that the supervision process can 
be objective in order to develop a clean, effective and efficient judicial system. The implementation and 
form of supervision carried out by the Judicial Commission may not violate the independence of 
judicial power. Therefore, the supervisory authority of the Judicial Commission is limited to non-
judicial matters. 
Similar to the Constitutional Court, the Judicial Commission is a relatively new constitutional 
phenomenon so that its presence in an ideal form is still at the formulation level. In Europe, there were 
7 (seven) countries that had the Judicial Commission until 1999, including: France, Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, Ireland, Sweden and Denmark. Meanwhile, throughout the world, out of 197 countries of UN 
members, there are 43 countries - including the 7 European countries, which have Judicial Commission. 
In 21 of the 43 countries, the Chief of the Supreme Court as Ex-officio becomes the Chief of the 
Judicial Commission. Meanwhile, in other countries (including Indonesia), the provisions regarding the 
organizational structure of the Judicial Commission are not regulated in the constitution.
17
 
The Judicial Commission of the Republic of Indonesia consists of a chairman, a deputy chairman 
who concurrently serves as a member, and five members consisting of former judge, legal practitioner, 
legal academic, and community member.
 18
 They are appointed and dismissed by the President with the 
approval of the DPR for a term of 5 years and after that can be re-elected for one term.
19
 The following 
requirements must be met if someone wants to be a member of the Judicial Commission: (1) Indonesian 
citizens; (2) devoted to God Almighty; (3) the lowest age is 40 (forty) years and the highest is 68 (sixty 
eight) years; (4) having a minimum 15 (fifteen) years of experience in legal field; (5) possessing 
impeccable integrity and personality; (6) physically and mentally healthy; (7) have never been 
sentenced for committing a crime; and (8) reporting a list of assets.
20
 
In order to carry out their functions honestly and optimally, the members of the Judicial 
Commission are prohibited from concurrently serving as: (1) state official or state organizer according 
to legislations; (2) judge; (3) advocate; (4) notary and/or Land Deed Officer (PPAT); (5) entrepreneurs, 
manager or employees of state-owned enterprises (BUMN) or private business entities; (6) civil 
servants; or (7) political party management.
21
 The process of respectful dismissal to the membership of 
the Judicial Commission from his position is carried out by the President at the suggestion of the 
Judicial Commission if: (1) dies; (2) own request; (3) physically and mentally sick continuously; or (4) 
the term of office ends. Meanwhile, the process of disrespectful dismissal is done by the President in 
agreement with the DPR at the suggestion of the Judicial Commission because: (1) violating the oath of 
office; (2) sentenced to criminal for committing a crime based on a court decision that has obtained 
permanent legal force; (3) committing disgraceful deeds; (4) continually neglecting their obligations; or 
                                                             
17
 Djohansjah,  2008,  Reformasi  Mahkamah  Agung  Menuju   Independensi   Kekuasaan  Kehakiman, 
Bekasi : Kasaint Blanc,  2008, p. 115-116. 
18
 Indonesia, Undang-Undang  Nomor 18 Tahun 2011 Tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-Undang Nomor 22 
Tahun 2004 Tentang Komisi Yudisial, Lembaran  Negara Republik Indonesia (LNRI) Tahun 2011 Nomor 
106 dan Tambahan Lembaran Negara  (TLN)  Nomor 5250, Pasal 6. 
19
 Indonesia, Undang-Undang Nomor 18 Tahun 2011 Tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-Undang Nomor  22 
Tahun 2004 Tentang Komisi Yudisial, Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia (LNRI) Tahun 2011 Nomor 
106 dan Tambahan Lembaran Negara (TLN)  Nomor 5250, Pasal 29. 
20
 Indonesia, Undang-Undang Nomor 18 Tahun 2011 Tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-Undang Nomor  22 
Tahun 2004 Tentang Komisi Yudisial, Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia (LNRI) Tahun 2011 Nomor 
106 dan Tambahan Lembaran Negara (TLN) Nomor 5250, Pasal 26. 
21
 Indonesia,  Undang–Undang Nomor  22 Tahun 2004Tentang Komisi Yudisial, Lembaran Negara Republik  
Indonesia  (LNRI)  Tahun 2004  Nomor 89 dan Tambahan Lembaran Negara  (TLN)  Nomor 4415, Pasal 
31. 
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(5) violating the prohibition of dual position based on legislations.
22
 In carrying out its duties and 
functions, the Judicial Commission is assisted by the Secretariat General led by a Secretary General 
who is a civil servant. The Secretariat General of the Judicial Commission has the task of providing 
operational administrative and technical support to the Judicial Commission.
23
 
 
2. Duties and Authorities of the Judicial Commission of the Republic of Indonesia 
The clarity of the legal structure of the Judicial Commission in the constitutional structure, 
especially in judicial power, is stated in Article 24B paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution that: “The 
Judicial Commission shall be independent in nature and have the competence to make proposals for the 
appointment of supreme justices as well as other competences within the framework of safeguarding 
and upholding the honor, the high status and the behavior of judges”. Operationally, the provisions of 
Article 24B paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution are described in Article 13 of Law No. 22 of 2004 
concerning Judicial Commission (hereinafter referred to as UUKY) that in its position as a judicial 
institution, the Judicial Commission is given authorities to: 
(1) Propose the appointment of supreme justices to the DPR. 
(2) Safeguard and uphold the honor, the high status and the behavior of judges.24 
Based on these provisions, the Judicial Commission has at least two main authorities, namely: 1) 
proposing the appointment of supreme justices and 2) safeguarding and upholding the honor, the high 
status and the behavior of judges. From the first authority, it can be said that KY is a state institution 
that has the authority to serve. Thus, KY can be called a state institution providing services (auxiliary 
body). However, based on the second authority, the Judicial Commission is not an auxiliary body. It 
means that KY is the main state institution. Hence, according to Sri Soemantri, there are two 
characteristics of state institutions in the Judicial Commission.
25
 The formulation of Article 24B of the 
1945 Constitution after the amendment to Article 13 of Law No. 22 of 2004 concerning Judicial 
Commission is substantially considered to weaken the position of the Judicial Commission and is not in 
accordance with the initial idea of establishing a Judicial Commission. The establishment of a Judicial 
Commission is regulated in Article 24B of the 1945 Constitution that: 1) The Judicial Commission shall 
be independent in nature and have the competence to make proposals for the appointment of supreme 
justices as well as other competences within the framework of safeguarding and upholding the honor, 
the high status and the behavior of judges; 2) The members of the Judicial Commission must have 
knowledge and experience in matters of law and an integrity and personality beyond reproach, 3) The 
members of the Judicial Commission are to be appointed and dismissed by the President in agreement 
with the DPR, and 4) The organization, authority, and membership of the Judicial Commission shall be 
regulated by law. 
Thus, in carrying out its duties and authorities, the Judicial Commission also works with the 
Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, not with the government or the House of Representatives. 
In carrying out its duties and authorities, the Judicial Commission must be closer to the Supreme Court 
and the Constitutional Court, not with the government or parliament. More specifically, the Judicial 
                                                             
22
 Indonesia, Undang - Undang   Nomor  22  Tahun  2004  Tentang  Komisi Yudisial,  Lembaran Negara 
Republik Indonesia (LNRI) Tahun 2004 Nomor 89 dan Tambahan Lembaran Negara (TLN) Nomor 4415, 
Pasal 32 dan 33 Ayat (1). 
23
 Indonesia,   Undang-Undang Nomor 18 Tahun 2011 Tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-Undang Nomor 22 
Tahun 2004 Komisi Yudisial, Lembaran Negara Republik  Indonesia (LNRI) Tahun 2011 Nomor 106 dan 
Tambahan Lembaran Negara (TLN)  Nomor 5250, Pasal 12 Ayat (1). 
24
 Indonesia,  Undang-Undang Nomor 18 Tahun 2011 Tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-Undang Nomor 22 
Tahun 2004 Tentang  Komisi Yudisial, Lembaran Negara Republik  Indonesia (LNRI) Tahun 2011 Nomor 
106 dan Tambahan Lembaran Negara (TLN)  Nomor 5250, Pasal 12. 
25
 Titik  Triwulan  Tutik, 2008, Pokok-Pokok Hukum Tata Negara Indonesia Pasca Amandemen UUD 1945, 
Jakarta : Cerdas Pustaka Publisher, p. 266. 
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Commission must take distance so that the Judicial Commission does not become a political tool for 
politicians, both those who occupy executive or legislative positions, the government or the House of 
Representatives to control and intervene in the independence of the judicial power.
26
 
On the contrary, based on Article 2 of Law No. 22 of 2004 concerning Judicial Commission, the 
Judicial Commission is a state institution that is independent and is free from interference of other 
powers in carrying out its authority. Thus, the Judicial Commission as an independent institution must 
be free from the intervention and influence of other state institutions. However, being independent does 
not mean that the Judicial Commission is not required to be accountable by the Law.  
According to the provisions of Chapter III Article 13 of Law No. 18 of 2011 concerning 
Amendments to Law No. 22 of 2004 concerning Judicial Commission, the Judicial Commission has the 
authority to (a) propose the appointment of supreme justices and (b) safeguard and uphold the honor, 
the high status and the behavior of judges. Furthermore, as stated in Article 14 of Law No. 22 of 2004, 
in carrying out its authority as referred to Article 13 letter a, the Judicial Commission has the duties to: 
(1) Register candidates for Supreme Justices; 
(2) Select candidates for Supreme Justices; 
(3) Determine candidates for Supreme Justices; and 
(4) Propose candidates for Supreme Justices to the DPR. 
Article 14 Paragraph (1) of Law No. 22 of 2004 concerning Judicial Commission states: (i) In the 
event that the term of office of the Supreme Justices end, the Supreme Court submits the list of names 
of the Supreme Justices to the Judicial Commission within a period of at least 6 (six) months before the 
term of office ends; and (ii) the implementation of the task referred to Paragraph (1) is conducted within 
a period of 6 (six) months at the latest since the Judicial Commission receives notification from the 
Supreme Court regarding the vacancy of the Supreme Justices. Within a maximum period of 15 
(fifteen) days from receiving notification regarding the vacancy of the Supreme Justices, the Judicial 
Commission announced the registration of the candidates for supreme justices for 15 (fifteen) 
consecutive days. The Supreme Court, the government and the community can propose candidates for 
Supreme Justices to the Judicial Commission. The proposal of candidates as referred to paragraph (2) 
shall be made in the announcement of registration of candidates for supreme justices as referred to 
paragraph (1). In Article 20 of Law No. 18 of 2011 Regarding Amendments to Law No. 22 of 2004 
concerning Judicial Commission, it is stated: 
(1) In terms of safeguarding and upholding the honor, the high status and the behavior of judges, the 
Judicial Commission has the duties to: 
1. Supervise the behavior of judges; 
2. Receive report from the community relating to violations of the Code of Ethics and/or the 
Code of Conduct of Judges; 
3. Verify, clarify and investigate the report of alleged violations of the Code of Ethics and/or the 
Code of Conduct of Judges; 
4. Decide whether or not the report of alleged violation of the Code of Ethics and/or the Code of 
Conduct of Judges is correct; and 
5. Take legal steps and/or other steps against individuals, groups, or legal entities that demean 
the honor and the high status of judges. 
(2) In addition to the duties as referred to paragraph (1), the Judicial Commission also has the duty to 
increase the capacity and welfare of judges. 
(3) In order to safeguard and uphold the honor, the high status and the behavior of judges as referred 
to paragraph (1) letter a, the Judicial Commission may request assistance from law enforcement 
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officials to conduct wiretapping and record conversations in the event of a violation of the Code 
of Ethics and/or the Code of Conduct of Judges. 
(4) Law enforcement officials are obliged to follow up on the request of the Judicial Commission as 
referred to paragraph (3). 
 
B. Position and Authority of the Judicial Commission in European Countries 
One of the reasons of the establishment of the Judicial Commission in European countries is to 
revive public trust against judiciary. Many reasons and motives exist to establish Judicial Commission 
in European countries. Yet, in some European countries, Judicial Commission is established with the 
aim of developing and realizing efficient judiciary. Judging from the historical background of the 
Judicial Commission in the European Union, the establishment of the Judicial Commission was inspired 
by the emergence of a wave of democracy in Eastern Europe which demands a judicial process that can 
be trusted by the public. The initial idea of establishing a Judicial Commission in Europe was to 
connect the interests of the government and the interests of the judiciary as well as to guarantee judicial 
independence. In that context, the main roles of the Judicial Commission in the European Union are; 1) 
to guarantee the judicial system, 2) to propose professional candidates for judges, 3) to provide quality 
education to judges, 4) to test the competence of judges, 5) to uphold the code of ethics of judges, 6) to 
develop public networks, and 7) to take over the judicial management function from the government. 
These roles are described by various advanced authorities concerning disciplinary action, determination 
of judges’ career, judges’ selection, judges’ education, and general policies regarding public services 
available in judiciary, such as budget facilities, official housing, and technological upgrading. 
The Judicial Commission in Northern Europe has responsibility and competence in the area of 
technical policy, namely policy making in judicial field. The first function is related to how to 
streamline the judicial budget and formulate SOP related to Public Relations. The second function is the 
managerial function carried out on the judiciary which includes housing for judges, courtrooms, and 
public information. Meanwhile, the Judicial Commission in Southern Europe has the authority in 
determining careers, recruitment, education, periodic training, rotation, mutation, and promotion of 
judges as well as enforcement of discipline (code of ethics).
27
 As a comparison, the position, duties and 
authority of the Judicial Commission in northern Europe, namely the Netherlands, will be explained.  
 
1. Judicial Power and Background of the Establishment of the Judicial Commission in the 
Netherlands 
Judicial power in the Dutch constitutional system is described as a judicial institution that has 
independence as regulated in the Dutch constitution (ground wet).28 The Dutch Constitution states that 
members of the judiciary (judges) and the Procerure General in the Supreme Court are appointed for a 
lifetime by the government. Members of the judiciary can only be suspended temporarily or fully 
dismissed by the court specified in the Law. Thus, constitutional guarantees for judicial independence 
are only valid for individual members of the judiciary. 
In a functional sense, the judicial independence in the Netherlands is guaranteed at all levels. 
However, the Dutch system does not recognize the terms absolute independence and absolute 
separation of powers. The separation of powers in the Dutch system has the characteristics of checks 
and balances where the most important state powers work together in certain fields, influence each 
other and (as a result of that) control each other. Therefore, to some extent, the judiciary depends on 
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other state powers.
29
 In an operational context, the judiciary in the Netherlands is partially dependent on 
the government, namely the Minister of Justice who has a managerial responsibility for the budget and 
acts as an agency responsible for the supporting staff of the judiciary. The government is also involved 
in appointing members of judiciary and monitoring various non-intrinsic data from the judiciary. 
Since 1992, the judiciary in the Netherlands has made fundamental changes. This change was 
specifically made to create conditions that can improve and maintain the quality and services of the 
judiciary and to create a balance in the structure of the judiciary.
30
 In 1977, the Dutch Minister of 
Justice and Security and the Dutch Lower House established a commission called the Leemhuis 
Commission to provide input on matters relating to the management and quality of future judicial 
institutions.
31
 On January 1998, the Leemhuis Commission issued its final report entitled ‘Jurisdiction 
with the Time’. The report contains an input to the Minister of Justice to continue the establishment of a 
Judicial Commission. The Judicial Commission is an intermediary organization between politics and 
administrators who are politically responsible for the judiciary (the Minister of Justice). The Judicial 
Commission is like a double-edged sword where in one hand, it promotes judicial independence in an 
organizational sense, on the other hand, it broadens the responsibility and self-responsibility of the 
judiciary, especially in the fields of administration, management and budget.
32
 
The establishment of the Judicial Commission is part of a wider revised operational framework of 
the Dutch judiciary. The goal is essentially practical, namely a Judicial Commission can help expand 
the managerial responsibility of the judiciary. In line with the proposal of the implementation of integral 
management, the presence of the Judicial Commission is also expected to improve the efficiency and 
the independence of the judiciary. The Judicial Commission has a number of authorities in policy 
making (including external affairs, public services, judicial collaboration, personnel management and 
appointment of candidates for judges, and provide advice to the Minister of Justice for quality 
improvement) and duties related to management (including housing and security, automation, 
organizational administration, and provision of administrative information).
33
 Considering the need for 
the judiciary to focus on their judicial duties and the inefficiency of budget management by the 
judiciary, in 2002, an integrated judicial management system and the establishment of a Judicial 
Commission in the Dutch judicial system is realized through a judicial system reorganization program 
in the Netherlands.
34
 The Dutch Judicial Commission is known by the name Raad Voor de Rechtspraak 
or the Netherlands Council for the Judiciary (NCJ). The name is regulated in the Judicial Act 1827. NCJ 
was officially established on January 1, 2011 as an independent institution that has the main role to 
overcome several problems faced by the Dutch judicial system, including the budget. NCJ has 4 
members proposed by the Ministry of Law and approved by the Kingdom of the Netherlands with a 
term of 6 years and can be extended for 3 years.
35
 
 
2. Duties and Authorities of the Netherlands Council for the Judiciary 
The Netherlands Council for the Judiciary carries out a number of policy-making tasks and other 
tasks related to management and budget. The duties and authorities of the NCJ are; a) Policy making 
(including external affairs, public services, judicial collaboration, personnel management, judges 
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selection policies, research policies, provides advice to the Department of Justice, and quality policies); 
b) Authorities related to management (including housing and security, automation, organizational 
administration, and provision of administrative information); c) Budget policies (budget procedures, 
budget distribution procedures, and justification of budget expenditures); and d) Other authorities 
(including corrective or disciplinary authority, proposing candidates for judges, and proposing 
promotion and placement of judges).
36
 
 
CONCLUSION 
            The duties and the authorities of the Judicial Commission are to support the implementation of 
the tasks of the judicial power which is ultimately held by the Supreme Court. The tasks relate to the 
recruitment of supreme justices and the coaching of judges in an effort to safeguard and uphold the 
honor, the high status and the behavior of judges. The honor, the high status and the behavior of judges 
are very important to be safeguarded and upheld so that the judicary system as a whole can be trusted 
by the community. Democracy will not grow and develop without being controlled by the rule of law 
which is based on a credible judicial power system. To safeguard and build confidence, a separate 
institution is needed to carry out this effort. Judicial Commission has an important position so as 
structurally, its position is aligned with the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. However, it 
should be noted that, although structurally its position is aligned with the Supreme Court and the 
Constitutional Court, but functionally, its role is auxiliary to the judicial power institutions. Although 
the function of Judicial Commission is related to judicial power, but Judicial Commission is not an 
agent of judicial power.  
The Judicial Commission is not a code of law enforcement agency, but a code of ethics 
enforcement agency because this commission only deals with the honor, the high status and the 
behavior of judges, not with judicial institutions or judicial power institutions. This system is quite 
different from the Judicial Commission in Europe, especially in Northern Europe. The Judicial 
Commission in Northern Europe, as represented by the Netherlands, has responsibility and competence 
in the area of technical policy, policy making in the judiciary field, authority relating to management 
and budget policy, and other authorities, such as corrective or disciplinary authority, authority for 
proposing candidates for judges in appointment process, etc. 
 
SUGGESTION 
The Judicial Commission in Indonesia needs to adopt or imitate the Netherlands Council for the 
Judiciary and adapt it to the constitutional system in Indonesia. The Netherlands Council for the 
Judiciary has the authority in managing organization, budget and administration as well as in 
conducting promotions, transfers, and recruitment as well as imposing sanctions on judges. Thus, the 
Supreme Court only focuses on carrying out judicial functions and does not deal with administrative 
and judicial organization matters. Thus, the Supreme Court is expected to become a professional 
institution in enforcing law and justice. 
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